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CASES- NOTED
BANKRUPTCY-UNCLAIMED DIVIDENDS-DISTRIBUTION TO CREDITORS
WHO HAVE NOT BEEN PAID IN FULL
S was adjudicated bankrupt in 1901. A final dividend of about 7%owas
declared on allowable claims. Dividend checks totaling approximately $1,500
were never presented for payment. Section 66 of the Bankruptcy Act 1 pro-
vides that unclaimed dividends .shall be distributed to creditors whose claims
have not been paid in full. P was such a creditor and sued to recover the fund
for itself and all others in this class who might join in the proceeding and
establish their rights. Notice by publication was given but no other creditor
appeared. The District Court's order directed the Treastfrer of the United
States to turn over 7% of the fund to P and that the balance of the fund be
retained for the benefit of the other proved creditors of the bankrupt to await
applications by them for payment of their pro rata shares of said balance.
2
Held, that P is entitled to the whole fund since he is the only creditor proved
to have an interest in the fund. (judge Frank, dissenting). I the matter
of Searles, 119 N. Y. L. J. 38 (C. C. A. 2d, Feb. 18, 1948).
The precise issue involved in the instant case, whether unclaimed dividends
should be held for pro rata distribution to all proved creditors or only to those
who join in the proceedings for distribution, is one of first impression in a
circuit court of appeals. Several district court cases have held that the fund
should-go only to those creditors who have become parties to the proceedings.
3
Section 66 of the Bankruptcy Act does not specifically answer this issue.
4
Judge Leibell in the Raabe case, concluded that the intention of the statute was
"to effect a liquidation of those unclaimed funds . . .to the diligent creditors
whose claims have not been paid in full. This intention would be defeated if it
were necessary to wait upon the intervention of all creditors." 5
In 1935, the same circuit court deciding the principal case considered
Section 66 of the Bankruptcy Act, on another point but observed that it "does
1. 11 U. S. C. A. § 106(b) (1937), "Dividends remaining unclaimed for one year
shall ...be distributed to the creditors whose claims have been allowed but not paid
in full. . . ." This is not a statute of limitation since distribution and not lapse of time
tolls creditor's right to unclaimed dividends. In re Gubelman, 79 F. 2d 976 (C. C. A.
2d 1935). Accord, In re Van Schaick, 69 F. Supp. 764, 766 (S. D. N. Y. 1946).
2. In re Searles, 68 F. Supp. 678 (E. D. N. Y. 1946).
3. In re Bishop, 72 F. Supp. 199 (D. N. J. 1947); In re Raabe, Glissman & Co.,
71 F. Supp. 678 (S. D. N, Y. 1947); In re MacMasters, 60 F. Supp. 733 (S. D. N. Y.
1945).
4. It re Searles, 68 F. Supp. 678, 680 (E. D. N. Y. 1946), "Moreover, Congress
has not seen fit to provide even any suggestion as to the mechanics of the distribution
to be made, except that the Court shall make it."
5. In re Raabe, Glissman & Co., 71 F. Supp. 678, 681 (S. D. N. Y. 1947).
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not declare on whose motion dividends are to be distributed .... [P] erhaps
the court can distribute sua sponte; perhaps a single creditor may move for
itself and for all others; but, since distribution will ordinarily involve substan-
tial clerical work, practically it is not likely that anyone will get his share who
does not move." 6
In the instant case, P complied with all the statutory requirements. 7 Judge
Frank 8 disagreed with the majority as to the sufficiency of the notice. He sug-
gested that notice should have been sent to "all creditors whose claims bad
been allowed, at their last-known address. . . ." 9 And while the court might
order notice by publication it should do so only "where personal service ... is
not practicable." 10 Although the stature is not clear as to the type of notice to
be given; Section 66(a) of the Bankruptcy Act does give an indication of
Congressional intent. It directs that "Dividends ... which remain unclaimed
for sixty days after the final dividend has been declared and distributed shall be
paid into the court of bankruptcy; and at the same time the trustee shall file
with the clerk a list of the names and post-office addresses, as far as known, of
the persons entitled thereto, showing the respective amounts payable to them."
[Italics added] This act was amended in 1938 to include the provision re-
quiring the trustee to file the list of names and addresses, which is evidence of
Congressional intent that notice by personal service be given.
It is admitted that in the instant case this provision requiring the filing of
names and addresses was added 31 years after S was adjudicated bankrupt and
the money paid into court. However, it is submitted that P should have been
required to show that notice by personal service was impossible. Judge Swan's
answer to the effect that the sufficiency of the notice was not questioned in the
district court, is inadequate, because those creditors who might have had.an
interest were not present to contest the sufficiency of the notice by publication,
nor under these circumstances could there be a waiver of notice by personal
service.
6. In re Gubelman, 79 F. 2d 976, 977 (C. C. A. 2d 1935).
7. 28 U. S. C. A. § 852 (1928), "Any person . . . entitleA to any such money
may, on petitiop to the court from which the money was received, or its successor,
and upon notice to the United States attorney and full proof of right thereto, obtain an
order of court directing the payment of such money to claimant. .. ."
8. In the matter of Searles, 119 N. Y. L. J. 38 (C. C. A., 2d 1948).
9. Ibid. Apparently Judge Frank is relying on the language of 11 U. S. C. A.
§ 94(b) (1937), as he refers to § 94(d) as limiting the power to order notice by
publication only to the courts.
10. Supra, note 8; 11 U. S. C. A. § 94(d) (1937) is relied upon.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PROHIBITION OF PRACTICE OF NATURO-
PATHY AS A SEPARATE BRANCH OF THE HEALING ARTS
A Tennessee statute' prohibited the practice of naturopathy 2 and re-
pealed an act 3 which provided for the licensing of naturopaths. Several
naturopaths filed a representative suit to determine the constitutionality of the
act. The Chancellor upheld the repeal of the licensing provisions* but declared
that portion prohibiting the practice of naturopathy an unwarranted abuse of
the police power. On appeal, held, that the statute must be treated as one impos-
ing additional qualifications upon persons already in the practice and was
therefore a valid exercise of the police power. Davis v. Beeler, 207 S. W. 2d
343 (Tenn. 1948).
At common law any one niight practice medicine in any of its branches-
the right being subject to liability for lack of skill and the power of the govern-
ment to prevent practice by incompetents. 4 The healer's right to practice his
profession has been calfed a mere privilege,5 a franchise,6 a valuable right,
7
and a property right.8 The protection afforded the right does- not seem to de-
pend on the "label" nor is it limited to physicians and surgeons. 9 There is,
however, no inherent right to practice the healing arts10-nor does the is-
suance of a license confer a contractual or a vested 12 right. It confers a
1. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1947, c. 2, §§ 1, 2.
2. Naturopathy has been defined as "A drugless way of treating disease by the
use of light, air, water, heat and massage." MALoy, TIE SIMPLIFIED MEDICAL Dic-
TIONARY FOR LAWYERS 352 (1942).
By statute it has been defined as "the prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of
human injuries, ailments, and diseases by the use of such physical forces, as air, light,
water, vibration, heat, electricity, hydrotherapy, psychotherapy, dietetics [sic], or
massage, and the administrations of botanical and biological drugs, but shall not include
the administration of narcotics, sulfa drugs ...or powerful physical agents, such as
X-ray and radium therapy, or surgery. . . ." Tenn. Pub. Acts 1945, c. 43, § 4.
3. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1943, c. 49 as amended, Tenn. Pub. Acts 1945, c. 43.
4. State v. Borah, 51 Ariz. 318, 76 P. 2d 757 (1938); Redmond v. State, 152
Miss. 54, 118 So. 360, 366 (1928). "Originally any person might ,legally practice medicine
or dentistry or compound medicines or the like. His fitness to do 'so was measured
only by public estimation." Indiana State Board v. Davis, 69 Ind. App. 109, 121 N. E.
142, 148 (1917).
5. State v. Edmunds, 127 Iowa 333, 101 N. W. .431 (1904).
6. State v. Anderson, 6 Tenn. Civ. App. 1, 11 (1917).
7. Abrams v. Jones, 35 Idaho 532, 207 Pac. 724 (1922).
8. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114 (1889); Butcher v. Maybury, 8 F. 2d
155 (W. D. Wash. 1925); State Board of Medical Examiners v. Friedman, 150 Tenn.
152, 263 S. W. 75 (1923).
9. "A person's business, profession, or occupation is . . . 'property,' within
the meaning of the constitutional provision as to due process of law ... " People v.
Love, 289 Ill. 304, 131 N. E. 809, 811 (1921) (chiropractic).
10. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114 (1889); Louisiana State Board of
Medical Examiners v. Fife, 162 La. 681, 111, So. 58 (1926), aff'd, 274 U. S. 720 (1927).
11. "A license has none of the elements of a contract and does not confer an absolute
right but a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions and guch
as may thereafter be reasonably imposed." Rosenblatt v. California State Board of
Pharmacy, 69 Cal. App. 2d 69, 158 P. 2d 199, 203 (1945) (refusal to renew assistant
pharmacist's license). See Note, 8 L. R. A. (x. s.) 1272 (1907).
12. ". . . the theory that an individual has a vested right to practice dentistry is
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qualified right subject to reasonable regulation under the police power.' 3
The practice of the healing arts lies completely within the police power
of the states.14 This power is exercised by the legislature and the courts are
not concerned with the wisdom but with constitutional limits on its exercise. It
has been said that the legislature may regulate but may not prohibit a calling
unless it is inherently injurious to thd public or has a tendency to become so. 15
In regulating a useful calling the legislature may prescribe such standards as
it deems necessary provided they are reasonable and not discriminatory. 16 The
legislature may demand educational and character qualifications prior to is-
suance of licenses.' 7 It may require persons previously engaged in the
practice to meet these standards.'8 Additional qualifications may be added 19
and an unlimited medical license or practice may be required of those desiring
to practice a limited system.20 If the licensee cannot meet these added require-
ments, he must give up his practice.
21
The Tennessee court considered this statute as one requiring additional
a rank heresy, finding no place in the philosophy of the law. Over and over again
it has been exploded by this court." State ex rel. Brown v. McIntosh, 205 Mo. 616,
103 S. W. 1071, 1077 (1907). See Note, 8 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1272 (1907).
13. ". . . there is no right to practice medicine which is not subordinate to the
police power of the States. . . ." Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U. S. 581, 596 (1926).
Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189 (1898); Allopathic State Board of Medical
Examiners v. Fowler, 50 La. Ann. 1358, 24 So. 809 (1898); Sears, Legal Control
of Medical Practices: Validity and Methods, 44 MicH. L. REV. 689 (1946).
14. Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U. S. 581 (1926); Mann v. Board of Medical
Examiners of the State, 187 P. 2d 1 (Cal. 1947).
15. Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590 (1917) (ordinary calling); State v. Arm-
strong, 38 Idaho 493, 225 Pac. 491 (1923) (chiropody). But see State v. Waldram, 64
Utah 406, 231 Pac. 431, 432 (1924) ("The Legislature has the power to prohibit the
practice of chiropractics.").
16. "It is only when they [requirements] have no relation to such calling or pro-
fession, or are unattainable by . . . reasonable study and application, that they can
operate to deprive one of his right to pursue a lawful vocation." Dent v. West
Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 122 (1889). Butcher v. Maybury, 8 F. 2d 155 (W. D. Wash.
1925); People v. Witte, 315 I1. 282, 146 N. E. 178 (1924).
17. Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189 (1898); Dent v. West Virginia, 129
U. S. 114 (1889).
18. Collins v. Texas, 223 U. S. 288 (1912).
19. Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505 (1903); Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189
(1898) ; Gray v. Connecticut, 159 U. S. 74 (1895); Rosenblatt v. California State Board
of Pharmacy, 69 Cal. App. 2d 69, 158 P. 2d 199 (1945) ; State v. Hovorka, 100 Minn. 249,
110 N. W. 870 (1907).
20. Crane v. Johnson, 242 U. S. 339 (1917) (exemption of faith lealers not dis-
criminatory as to other drugless healers); Polhemus v. American Medical Ass'n., 145
F. 2d 357 (C. C. A. 10th 1944) (not unreasonable to fail to include naturopaths in cover-
age of "Grandfather Clause" of Basic Science Law which entitled practitioners to Basic
Science certificate without examination); Ellestad v. Swayze, 15 Wash. 2d 281, 130
P. 2d 349 (1942) ; see Notes, 16 A. L. R. 709 (1922), 37 A. L. R. 680 (1925). Contra:
State v. Armstrong, 38 Idaho 493, 225 Pac. 491 (1923) (to require a chiropodist to
obtain the education and license of a physician and surgeon, an osteopath, or a chiro-
practor is unreasonable); Norman v. Hastings, unreported Memorandum Opinion,
Supreme Court of Tennessee, Dec. 20, 1920 (to require chiropractors to study and be
examined in subjects which they have no occasion to apply is unreasonable).
21. Rosenblatt v. California State Board of Pharmacy, 69 Cal. App. 2d 69, 158
P. 2d 199 (1945) ; State ex rel. Week v. Wisconsin State Board of Examiners, 30 N. W.
2d 187 (Wis. 1947).
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qualifications of naturopaths already in the practice. The complainants con-
tended that the enactment could not be construed as regulatory and that it
expressly prohibited the practice of naturopathy by all persons within-the
state.22 The court said that the statute must be considered with other legisla-
tion regulating the healing arts.23 When so considered, it is apparent that the
methods used by naturopaths may still be used by physicians and osteopaths-
and may be used by complainants when they meet the added qualifications
reasonably deemed necessary by the legislature. So interpreted, the statute is
unobjectionable.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE HELD
VALID EXERCISE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
The House of Representatives created the Committee on Un-American
Activities and authorized it to conduct investigations of "(i) the extent,
character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United
States, (ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-Amer-
ican propaganda . . . . and (iii) all other questions in relation thereto that
would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation." 1 Defendant was
summoned before this committee and appeared but refused to be sworn or to
answet any questions whatever. He was convicted under a federal statute 2
for his refusal and appeals to this court on the ground (among others) that
any investigation by the committee as now authorized would necessarily in-
volve private affairs and hence be unconstitutional. Held, that the investigation
N
22. "That hereafter it shall be unlawful for any person, whether heretofore licenred
[sic] or not under the provisions of Chapter 49, Public Acts of 1943, as amended, to
practice in this State Naturopathy as defined in said Acts or otherwise." Tenn. Pub.
Acts 1947, c. 2, § 2.
The complainants contended this was outright prohibition. They emphasized "any
person." Brief for Appellees, pp. 31-32. They also contended that the requirement that
they qualify as physicians or osteopaths was unreasonable, relying on Norman v. Hastings,
unreported Memorandum Opinion, Supreme Court of Tennessee, Dec. 20, 1920.
Brief for Appellees, pp. 47-49. This case was in point and was quoted in full in the
Chancellor's decree. Record, p. 74. But the court in the instant case did not mention the
unreported opinion. The fact that a case was unreported greatly weakens its weight as
authority since the court's practice is never to refer to such opinions unless compelled
to do so by counsel. Ford v. State, 184 Tenn. 443, 454, 201 S. W. 2d 539, 544 (1945) ;'
Phoenix Cotton Oil Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 140 Tenn. 438, 443, 205 S. W. 128,
130 (1918).
23. "The present statute discloses an effort on the part of the Legislature to regulate
one phase of the healing arts and should be construed in pari materia with other statutes
upon this subject." 207 S. W. 2d at 346.
Statutes forming a system or scheme sh6uld be construed so as to make it uniform
and all acts in pari materia should be construed together. State v. Allman, -167 Tenn.
240, 68 S. W. 2d 478 (1934).
1. 60 STAT. 812, 828 (1946).
2. R.Ev. STAT. § 102 (1878), as amended, 52 Stat. 942 (1838), 2 U. S. C. A. § 192
(Supp. 1947).
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by the committee is a constituti6nal exercise of the Congressional power.
(Clark, J. dissentigg); United States v. Josephson, 165 F. 2d 82 (C. C. A. 2d
1947), cert. denied, 92 L. Ed. 425 (1948).
The legislative investigation is an institution of ancient origin and this
power has been recognized by state courts as being very broad.3 The power of
Congress to -appoint committees for this purpose in appropriate situations is
unchallenged, the controversial question being the limits of the investigation. It
has long been established that Congress may order investigations to "aid it
in legislating," 4 and the recent expressions of this view are to the effect
that the inquiry need only be "germane to some matter concerning which the
house conducting the investigation has power to act (whether such action be
enactment of statutes or something else)." r There has arisen a substantial
body of authority upholding the power to investigate business transactions
and public affairs in situations where the possibility of legislation was very
remote. 6 On analysis, it seems that courts are in reality using the test of
whether the subject is one of public concern and allowing the investigation
for publicity purposes rather than in aid of legislation. However, the decisions
still render lip service to the prospective legislation test. Another factor to be
considered is the volume of older decisions denying the power to investigate
private matters.7 While these cases have been generally distinguished, as in
the instant case, they have not been expressly overruled and are still available
to invalidate investigations which are found by the courts to involve "private
rights."
Both majority and dissenting opinions in the instant case recognize the
precedents listed above, but they differ as to their application to the facts
present here. The majority says, "Surely, matters which potentially affect the
very survival of our Government are by no means the purely personal con-
cern of any one. And investigations into such matters are inquiries relating
3. Sheppard v. Bryant, 191 Mass. 591, 78 N. E. 394 (1906) ; Burnham v. Morrissey,
14 Gray 226 (Mass. 1859); State v. Brewster, 89 N. J. L. 658, 99 At. 338 (1916);
Briggs v. Mackellar, 2 Abb. Pr. 30 (N. Y. 1855) ; Ex parte Parker, 74 S. C. 466, 55 S. E.
122 (1906). "Prior to 1880 no state decision denies or curtails the exercise of such a
power; instead, it received the explicit sanction .. ." Landis, Constitutional Limitations on
the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 HARv. L. REv. 153, 167 (1926).
4. United States v. Norris,* 300 U. S. 564 (1937); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273
U. S. 135 (1927).
5. Seymour v. United States, 77 F. 2d 577, 580 (C. C. A. 8th 1935); Townsend
v. United States, 95 F. 2d 352 (App. D. C. 1938); United States v. Bryan, 72 F. Supp.
58 (D. C. 1947) (upholding constitutionality of the Un-American Activities Committee).
6. Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U. S. 125 (1935); United States v. Louisville &
Nashville Ry. Co., 236 U. S. 318 (1915); In re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661, 668 (1897) ;
Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 147 F. 2d 658 (C. C. A. 10th 1945), aff'd, 327 U. S.
186 (1946) ; Mississippi Road Supply Co. v. Walling, 136 F. 2d 391 (C. C. A. 5th 1943) ;
United States v. Creech, 21 F. Supp. 439 (D. C. 1937); United States v. Groves, 18
F. Supp. 3 (W. D. Pa. 1937).
7. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263, 294 (1929) ; In re Chapman, 166 U. S.
661, 668 (1897) ; Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 190 (1880); In re Pacific Ry.
Commission, 32 Fed. 241, 250 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1887).
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to the personal affairs of private individuals only to the extent that those in-
dividuals are a part of the Government as a whole." 8 But the dissent feels,
"A doctrine that the lesser legislative power always justifies the exercise of
the greater investigative power, including control over opinion, will lead to
strange analogies indeed ... Clearly it makes the power to investigate limit-
less." 9 This controversy goes at once to the heart of the issue and, granting
either premise, the result reached in the respective opinions is inevitable in
the light of the established precedents.
In addition to the principal issue the dissenting judge feels that the resolu-
tion is too vague, so that this prosecution comes within the principle of such
cases as Lanzetta v. New Jersey,10 which holds that when a criminal statute
is so vague as not to provide an intelligible standard of conduct, the statute
violates the due process clause of the Constitution. While the point is avoided
in the majority opinion by denying defendant's right to question vagueness
due to his refusal to answer any questions, the issue was squarely met in
United States v. Bryan,1 where the district court expressly stated that the
cases cited by Judge Clark are strictly confined to penal statutes and do not
apply to resolutions of this nature or to the statutes enforcing them.'
2
The dissent also attacks the constitutionality of the resolution on the
ground that the committee has been conducting a "witch hunt." 13 However,
this contention would appear to be immaterial to the question of constitutional-
ity as there seems to be a presumption in favor, of the legislative purpose be-
hind a Congressional committee's action. 4
CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-ADMISSION OF CONFESSION
A confectionery store was robbed and its owner was shot and killed.
Five days later petitioner, a fifteen year old Negro boy, was arrested and
accused of having acted as lookout while two other youths committed the
crime. His treatment at police headquarters following arrest is the subject
of direct contradiction, but it is agreed that after being questioned for five
hours, beginning at midnight, he signed a confession. Afterwards he was held
incommunicado for three days and both his mother and a lawyer retained by
her were denied admission to see him. Petitioner was not taken before a
8. United States v. Josephson, 165 F. 2d 82, 89 (C. C. A. 2d 1947).
9. Id. at 98.
10. 306 U. S. 451 (1939) ; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (1937).
11. 72 F. Supp. 58 (D. C. 1947).
12. Id. at 63.
13. For a criticism of the manner in which the Committee is conducted see,
Gellhorn, Report on a Report of the House Committee on Un-American Activities,
60 HARv. L. REv. 1193 (1947).
14. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 13. S. 135 (1927); Townsend v. United States,
95 F. 2d 352 (App. D. C. 1938) ; United States v. Bryan, 72 F. Supp. 58 (D. C. 1947).
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magistrate and formally charged with a crime until three days after his con-
fession. The trial court allowed the confession to be admitted as evidence and
found petitioner guilty of murder in the first degree. The Court of Appeals of
Ohio sustained the conviction 1 over the objection that the admission of the
confession by the trial court violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the Con-
stitution.2 The state supreme court dismissed the appeal, being of the opinion
that no debatable constitutional question was presented.8 On hearing by the
United States Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari, held, that the confession
was not made voluntarily and its admission was a violation of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Chief Justice Vinson, Justices Jack-
son, Reed, and Burton, dissenting.) Haley v. State, 68 Sup. Ct. 302 (1948).
The fact that a trial court has ruled that a confession was voluntarily
made does not preclude the United States Supreme Court from independently
determining the question. 4 If the Court finds that the confession was admitted
under circumstances offensive to the requirements of due process it may set
the conviction aside.5 It has been held previously that the determination of the
triers of fact should be accepted "unless it is so lacking in support in the
evidence that to give it effect would work that fundamental unfairness which
is at war with due process." 6 The Court in the Lisenba case 7 was reluctant
to set aside the findings of two courts and a jury. In the instant case three
courts and a jury held that the confession made by petitioner was voluntary,
and both She court of appeals and the supreme court of the state held that
there was no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 As stated by Mr.
Justice Burton in the dissenting opinion, the Court "is not justified in mak-
ing such a determination of 'the callous attitude of the police' of Canton
as thereby to override not only the sworn testimony of the state's public
officials but also the conclusions of the triers of fact." 9 The police acted
wrongly in questioning petitioner for five hours without a break, and in hold-
ing him incommunicado for three days. These were two separate and distinct
acts. The Court should concern itself only with the facts surrounding the
making of the confession in determining whether or not it was voluntarily
made.10 Apparently the Court has used its power to shape the rules of evidence
1. State v. Lowder, 79 Ohio App. 237, 72 N. E. 2d 785 (1946).
2. U. S. CoNsT. AMFEND. XIV.
3. State v. Haley, 147 Ohio St. 340, 70 N. E. 2d 905 (1947).
4. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 (1944); Ward v. Texas, 316 U. S.
547 (1942); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940).
5. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936).
6. Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 238 (1941).
7. Ibid.
8. U. S. CONST. ATEND. XIV.
9. Haley v. State, 68 Sup. Ct. 302, 313 (1948).
10. United States v. Mitchell, 322 U. S. 65 (1944).
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as an indirect mode of disciplining the misconduct of the officers-a use which
has been discouraged.'
Certainly an accused should not be subjected to third degree practices.'
2
Still, the primary duty of law enforcement officers is the defense of the
community. It is submitted that reasoning by the courts similar to the majority
opinion in the instant case might go far to protect the accused individual but
will leave officers in the dark as to their rights to question a suspect; a right
which has been recognized previously by this Court.13 Mr. Justice Douglas
concludes the majority opinion with the following sentence: "The Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the police from using the private, secret custody of
either man or child as a device for wringing confessions from them." 14 What
right this leaves an officer to question a suspect is merely conjectural.
CRIMINAL LAW-NEGATIVE, ACTS-DUTY OF PARENT TO
PROTECT CHILD
The defendant appealed from a conviction for the unlawful killing of her
illegitimate three year old *daughter and was found guilty of "murder without
malice." 1 The child was living in the same house with the defendant and
Fred Kenner (it was not stated whether Kenner was the father of the child
or the husband of the defendant). The death of the child resulted from brutal
whippings administered by Kenner. There was no evidence that the defendant
was aiding or had agreed to the whippings. Held, reversed, that mere presence
alone, in the absence of agreement to the offense, is not sufficient to constitute
one a principal in the criminal act. Moffitt v. State, 207 S. W. 2d 384 (Tex.
1948).
The court stated that "evidently the conviction must be based' on Art.
69 P. C." 2 which reads as follows: "Any person who advises or agrees to the
commission of an offense and who is present when the same is committed
is a principal whether he aids or not in the illegal act."
If this is the only basis for conviction, the instant case seems correct in
11. Id. at 70.
12. McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of Con-
fessions, 24 TEXAs L. REv. 239, 244 (1946). "They [third degree practices] constitute a
betrayal and a mockery of those principles of respect for the worth of the individual
citizen upon which our religious ideas, our constitution, and our philosophy of government
rest."
13. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596, 601 (1944).
14. Haley v. State, 68 Sup. Ct. 302, 304 (1948).
1. The statute dealing with manslaughter has been repealed in Texas. And by statute,
voluntary homicide, committed without justification or excuse under the immediate
influence of a sudden passion arising from an adequate cause, is murder without malice.
TEX. PENAL CoE, Art. 1257c (Vernon 1936).
2. TEx. CoDE OF CaIns. PRo., Art. 69 (Vernon 1925).
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its holdings, as there are numerous cases holding that mere presence will not
make one a party to a crime.3 But there may have been another basis for
conviction. In certain instances the law imposes upon a special class of persons
a duty of a positive character, 4 and one may incur criminal liability for failure
to perform that duty. 5 This duty may exist because of the legal relations of
the parties.6 Apart from statutory requirements the common law imposes on
a father or mother the duty to provide food, shelter, and necessary medical
treatment 7 for a child who is too young to care for itself. A husband has a
duty to support his wife and rescue her from perilous situations in which she
is helpless.8 The criminal law also punishes for the failure to perform a duty,
resulting in the death of the person to whom the duty is owed, if the duty
arises from (I,) an express provision of the statute 9 (2) a factual situation,10
or (3) a contract."
This legal duty for positive action does not require the impossible.12 There
is no criminal-liability based upon negative acts unless the person having the
duty has the capacity and the ability to perform the legal duty. However, the
inability to d6 one thing may give rise to a legal duty to do another. 3
Where a person, who has a legal duty to act and has the ability to per-
form, willfully neglects to act and such failure results in the death of the
person to whom the duty is owed, the person owing the duty is guilty of un-
lawful homicide.14 If he maliciously refrained from performance, he would
be guilty of murder; 15 otherwise, it would be manslaughter. 16 If the failure
to act was due to negligence, it would be involuntary manslaughter, provided
3. Hicks v. United States, 150 U. S. 442, 37 L. Ed. 1137 (1893) ; Brooks v. State,
128 Ga. 261, 57 S. E. 483 (1907); People v. Cione, 293 Ill. 321, 127 N. E. 646 (1920).
4. Pallis v. State, 123 Ala. 12, 26 So. 339 (1899); Westrup v. Commonwealth,
123 Ky. 95, 93 S. W. 646 (1906) ; State v. Barnes, 141 Tenn. 469, 212 S. W. 100 (1919).
5. United States v. Knowles, 26 Fed. Cas. 800, (1864). Death of a human being
as the immediate result of the omission, by another, to perform a plain legal or con-
tract duty makes the latter guilty of felonious homicide. See Perkins, Negative Acts ill
Criminal Law, 22 IowA L. REv. 659 (1937), for a detailed treatment of the subject.
6. Lewis v. State, 72 Ga. 164 (1883) (D owed a duty to an orphan left in her
care). State v. Smith, 65 Me. 257 (1876) (A husband is charged by law with the duty
of rendering his wife proper support) ; State v. Staples, 126 Minn. 396, 148 N. W. 283
(1914); Regina v. Conde, 10 Cox C. C. 547 (1867).
7. Lewis v. State, 72 Ga. 164 (1883); Gibson v. Commonwealth, 106 Ky. 360,
50 S. W. 532 (1899) ; Stehr v. State, 92 Neb. 755, 139 N. W. 676 (1913).
8. Territory v. Manton, 8 Mont. 95, 19 Pac. 387 (1888).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (Deering 1941).
10. People v. Fowler, 178 Cal. 657, 174 Pac. 892 (1918) ; Stehr v. State, 96 Neb. 755,
139 N. W. 676 (1913); State v. Hopkins, 147 Wash. 198, 265 Pac. 481 (1928);
Regina v. Instan; 17 Cox C. C. 602 (1893).
11. State v. Benton, 38 Del. 1, 187 Atl. 609 (1936).
12. Territory v. Manton, 8 Mont. 95, 19 Pac. 387 (1888); State v. Noakes,
70 Vt. 247, 40 At!.-249 (1897).
13. Stehr v. State, 96 Neb. 755, 139 N. W. 676 (1913) (duty of parent to apply to
public authorities for relief).
14. United States v. Knowles, 26 Fed. Cas. 800 (1864).
15. Lewis v. State, 72 Ga. 164 (1883); State v. Barnes, 141 Tenn. 469, 212 S. W.
100 (1919).
16. See Note, 10 A. L. R. 1138 (1921).
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such failure amounted to criminal negligence.' 7 Otherwise it would be no
crime.
The question of whether or not a parent'is under a legal duty to go to
the aid of his helpless 'child whd is being violently attacked by a stranger or
by the other parent does not seem to have been answered by any court in this
country. However, in Rex v. Rssell,18 An Australian case decided in 1933, a
father, who stood by and watched the mother drown their two children, was
convicted of manslaughter. In view of existing law on the duty of the parent
to protect the child, this decision seems legally sound.
If such a legal duty exists, then it becomes important to know why the
defendant, in the instant case, did not attempt to save her child. Perhaps
she was terrified and reasonably feared that her own safety would be jeopard-
ized by any interference. On the other hand, a mere word from her might
have stopped the attack. Assuming that the defendant could have done noth-
ing at this particular time, Kenner's previous conduct may have been such
as would have put the defendant on notice that the child's life was in danger.
Then would not the defendant have been under a legal duty to remove the
child from such danger or to apply to public authorities for help? If it can
be found as a matter of fact that the defendant could have saved her child
but willfully did not, or was guilty of criminal negligence in not doing so, she
would be guilty of felonious homicide, not as one who aided or abetted, but
as one wh6 contributed to the death by her act of omission.
EQUITY-INTERPLEADER-LACIC OF POSSESSION OF GOODS INVOLVED
Complainant, operator of a storage warehouse, had held goods for more
than five years pending agreement between rival claimants, a Mr. and Mrs.
Keller, as to the ownership. While awaiting instructions as to disposition,
complainant was faced with a replevin suit instituted by D, who claimed
'under an assignment from Mrs. Keller. By virtue of this action the sheriff
seized the chattels, removed them from the complainant's warehbuse and de-
livered them to D, who executed a replevin bond. Mr. Keller then brought suit
against complainant, D, the sheriff and the surety on the replevin bond to re-
cover damages for non-delivery of the chattels to him. Complainant then filed
a bill of interpleader against D, Mr. Keller, the sheriff and the surety, prayed
that the legal actions against it be restrained, that D be enjoined from dis-
posing of the property, and that complainant be discharged of all liability.
Held, for complainant. Although it did not have possession of the chattels,
17. State v. Benton, 38 Del. 1, 187 Atl. 609 (1936).
18. Rex v. Russell, 1933 Vict. L. R. 59 (1933). Noted in 40 W. VA. L. Q. 387
(1934), 9 Wis. L. REv. 424 (1934); HARv. L. REV. 531 (1934).
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being a stakeholder without interest in the property, complainant was entitled
to protection from vexatious litigation by the rival claimants. C. F. Duke
Storage Warehonuse, Inc. v. Keller, 55 A. 2d 901 (Ch. Ct. N. J. 1947).
The right of interpleader arises where there are adverse claimants to a
debt, fund or thing owed by or in possession of a third person,' who admits
a debt or claims no interest in the property involved; 2 who is uncertain to
whom he owes a duty, and where no adequate relief from multiplicity of
actions has been provided at law.3 The exercise of this right is ringed with
- certain requirements. By the apparent weight of authority, one of these re-
quirements is that if the claimants are seeking a specific property the com-
plainant in interpleader must be in possession or control of the'fund or thing,
with power to perform a decree concerning it.4 This requirement has been
interpreted by many courts to mean: "The plaintiff must ... bring or pay, or
offer to bring or pay, the entire thing, fund, or money in controversy into
court .... " 5 An omission to do this has been held, by some courts, sufficient to
render the bill demurrable,6 defeat a request for an injunction 7 or prevent the
making of an order in the cause.8 The wisdom in such a rule lies in the fact
that, otherwise, bills of interpleader might result in abuse of the proceedings,
as where money is involved and this requirement is not enforced. 9 However, it
has been held that this rule does not prevent relief by way of interpleader where
complainant has paid over money under a claim of right to which he was
bound to submit.10 This exception has been sustained in favor of a garnishee
who was compelled to pay over money to a sheriff."
1. Finkel v. Affom Holding Corporation, 46 N. Y. S. 2d 378 (Sup. Ct. 1944);
Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Yaw, 53 F. 2d 684 (W. D. N. Y. 1931);
Bankers' Life Co. v. Waters, 39 Ohio App. 343, 177 N. E. 530 (1930); 30 AI. JuR.,
Interpleader § 8; 48 C. J. S., Interpleader § 2.
2. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Yaw, 53 F. 2d 684 (W. D. N. Y. 1931);
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 23 R. I. 1, 49 Atl. 26 (1901) ; 30 AM. Jun.,
Interpleader § 10.
3. 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1320 (5th ed. 1941); WALSH, EQUITY
§ 119 (1930); 30 AM. JUR., Interpleader § 12.
In Wall v. Wall, 181 S. W. 2d 817 (Ct. Civ. App. Tex. 1944), legal procedure
under a garnishment statute was thought substantially equivalent to equitable inter-
pleader, which therefore was found inapplicable. Often, however, it is held that the
applicability of equitable interpleader is not affected by the existence of a statutory
legal equivalent, the latter being considered merely a concurrent remedy. But this is
beyond the scope of this note. See, 4 POIEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENC § 1329
(5th ed. 1941).
'4. Mandon v. Rugg, 132 N. J. Eq. 538, 29 A. 2d 315 (1942) ; Nathan v. Bernstein,
252 App. Div. 497, 299 N. Y. Supp. 733 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Parker v. Parker, 42
N. H. 78 (1860); Shaw v. Coster, 8 Paige's Chanc. 339, 35 Am. Dec. 690, 702
(N. Y. 1840); 48 C. J. S., Interpleader § 9.
5. 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 920, § 1328 (5th ed. 1941).
6, Ibid.
7. Bliss v. French, 76 N. W. 73 (Sup. Ct. Mich. 1898).
8. 2 DANIELL, CHANCERY PRACTICE 1318 (8th ed. 1914).
9. Home Ins. Co. v. Caulk, 86 Md. 385, 38 AtI. 901 (1897); STORY, EQUITY
PLEADING § 291 (10th ed. 1892).
10. Nash v. Smith, 6 Conn. 421 (1827) ; 48 C. J. S., Interpleader § 10.
11..Webster v. McDaniel, 2 Del. Ch. 297 (1862).
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Under the facts in the instant case it appears that the court, although fol-
lowing a small minority of decisions, has reached a correct and just conclusion.
As the court pointed out, the possession of the property, although out of the
hands of the complainant, is under the control of the court through its order,
issued at an earlier hearing, restraining D from disposing of it; and although
complainant still owes a duty to the true owner, such duty has been suspended,
the property seized under the replevin suit being in control of the court which
is to determine ownership thereof. A further factor in support of the present
decision is the presence of a New Jersey statute 12 which provides, "If more
than one person claim the title or possession of the goods, the warehouseman
may, require all known claimants to interpled." The court has interpreted
this statute liberally-in holding that under its provisions a warehouseman need
not been in actual possession of the goods in order to support a bill of inter-
pleader. This interpretation possibly might be questiQned on the ground that
it oversteps the real legislative intent. However, it is submitted that under
the particular circumstances the court reached the correct result, inasmuch as
the dangers which gave rise to the rule requiring a complainant to bring, or
offer to bring, the property in controversy into court are not likely to be in-
volved.
FAMILY LAW-CHILD DENIED ACTION FOR ALIENATION OF HIS
MOTHER'S "AFFECTIONS
The complaint alleged that for many years the plaintiff had lived happily
with his mother and that the defendant had alienated her affections, causing
plaintiff to be forced out of the .home. Also, it was shown that plaintiff's
mother and father were divorced and that custody of the plaintiff was with
the mother. Defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that there
was no such cause of action. Held, that the demurrer should be sustained.
Taylor v. Keefe, 56 A. 2d 768 (Conn. 1947).
At the common law a husband was given an action for loss of the con-
sortium of his wife due to the alienation of her affections by a third person.
Based on a variety of reasons, this action N'ras denied to the wife.2 However,
12. Rav. STAT. 57: 1-20, N. J. S. A. (1937).
1. "'Consortium' means the 'companionship or society of the wife,' 'the conjugal
society arising by virtue of the marriage contract,' 'the duties and obligations which by
marriage both husband and wife take upon themselves toward each other in sickness and
health,' and includes 'conjugal affection, society and assistance.'" Harris v. Kunkel,
227 Wis. 435, 278 N. W. 868, 869 (1938); Holbrook, The Change in the Mealing of
Consortium, 22 MicE. L. Rv. 1 (1923).
2. Crocker v. Crocker, 98 Fed. 702 (C. C. D. Mass. 1899) (applying Massachusetts
law); Doe v. Roe, 82 Me. 503, 20 Atl. 83 (1890) ; Hodge v. Wetzler, 69 N. J. L. 490,
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with the passage of the married women's acts, most courts extended the ac-
tion to the wife.3 This extension was a logical recognition of the wife's right
to consortium and the removal of her disability to sue. A more recent de-
velopment in this field has been the passage by several states of statutes
abolishing the so-called "heart balm actions" of alienation of affections,
breach of promise, seduction and criminal conversation. 4 These statutes evi-
dence the disfavor in which courts and the general public have long held the
actions. In most states the action for alienation of affections is still recognized
and consortium is considered the gist of it, though often the courts do not
expressly so state.5
The question presented in the instant case is whether children have an
interest in the family relationship which will support a similar action for
damages. There is no apparent theoretical reason why such an interest should
not be recognized. Two recent cases have held that the deprivation of the love,
affection and support of a parent is an injury for which the child can recover.6
On the other hand, the present case, supported by a New York decision,
7
points out the dangers and practical difficulties of recognizing this right. 8 Also,
it should be noted that both of the cases allowing the remedy were decided
under Illinois law and the supreme court of that state has expressed approval
of the action for alienation of affections in an opinion holding the statute
abolishing "heart balm actions" to be unconstitutional on technical grounds. 9
55 Atl. 49 (Sup.'Ct. 1903) ; Smith v. Smith,'98 Tenn. 101, 38 S. W. 439 (1897) (holds
action exists but is held in abeyance during coverture) ; Duffies v. Duffies. 76 Wis. 374, 45
N. W. 522 (1890).
3. Fleming v. Fisk, 87 F. 2d 747 (App. D. C. 1936); Foot v. Card, 58 Conn.
1, 18 Atl. 1027 (1889); Betser v. Betser, 186 Ill. 537, 58 N. E. 249 (1900); Haynes
v. Nowlin, 129 Ind. 581, 29 N. E. 389 (1891); Lockwood v. Lockwood, 67 Minn.
476, 70 N. W. 784 (1897); Clow v. Chapman, 125 Mo. 101, 28 S. W. 328 (1894);
Gernerd v. Gernerd, 185 Pa. 233, 39 Atl. 884 (1898).
4. Twelve states have abolished the action. KEEZER, MARRIAGE AND DivoRcE §
191 (3d ed., Morland, 1946).
5. Boland v. Stanley, 88 Ark. 562, 115 S. W. 163 (1909); Valentine v. Pollak,
95 Conn. 556, 111 Atl. 869 (1920) ; Riggs v. Smith, 52 Idaho 43, 11 P. 2d 358 (1932) ;
Bigaouette v. Paulet, 134 Mass. 123 (1883); Jenness v. Simpson, 84 Vt. 127, 78 Atl.
886 (1911).
6. Daily v. Parker, 152 F. 2d 174 (C. C. A. 7th 1945); Johnson v. Luhman, 330
Ill. App. 598, 71 N. E. 2d 810 (1947).
7. Morrow v. Yannantuono, 152 Misc. 134, 273 N. Y. S. 912 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
8. The court in the instant case says, "Among the difficulties . . . are (I) possibility
of a multiplicity of suits; (2) possibility of extortionary litigation by virtue of the relative
tenuousness of the child's relationship; (3) inability to define the point at which the child's
right would cease, inasmuch as the status itself hypothesizes mutability, for although a
spouse is, barring extraordinary circumstances, always a spouse, the very nature of child-
hood implies an eventual change to adulthood; and (4) the inability of a jury adequately
to cope with the question of damages, particularly because damages thus assessed are apt to
overlap, in view of the number and different ages of the children." Taylor v. Keefe,
56 A. 2d 768, 770 (Conn. 1947).
9. Heck v. Schupp, 394 Ill. 296, 68 N. E. 2d 464, 466 (1946) (In a dictum the court
says, "the act under consideration here tends to put a premium on the violation of
moral law. . . . Moreover, as to criminal conversation and alienation of affections,
these involve the rights which all members of the family have a right to protect,")
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In addition the court expressed doubts as to the constitutionality of such a
statute in any event. Thus it is seen that the two cases upholding the action
were decided under the law of a state whose supreme court has given'approval
to the policy behind it, while the cases denying the action are in keeping with
current disapproval of such actions.
OIL AND GAS-INTEREST OF LESSEE UNDER OIL AND GAS LEASE CON-
DITIONED ON DOING OF SPECIFIED ACTS IS NOT ONE IN WHICH
DOWER IS ALLOWED
An oil and gas lease provided that "all oil and gas in and under" a
described tract of land was conveyed but did not specify the duration of -the
property interest transferred. The lease did provide for drilling of wells within
specified periods and for forfeiture if this drilling were not done. A royalty'
was reserved. In an action by the lessee's widow for assignment of dower,
held, that the lessee's interest was not an estate in fee simple in which a widow
could have a dower interest.' Van Camp v. Evans, 206 S. W. 2d 38 (Ky.
1947).
As noticed in the instant case, there is no agreement among the courts con-
cerning the interest of the lessee under an oil and gas lease. At least two
jurisdictions 2 hold that, in the absence of an expression of intention to the
contrary, a gas and oil lease is a conveyance of an estate in the oil and gas
in place. A much larger number of the oil-producing states 3 have held that,
in the absence of a contrary intention, such a lease gives the right to "enter
the land and take the oil and gas therefrom, thus, in reality, creating a profit
;i prendre. The Kentucky court appears to prefer the former of these views.
4
However it has frequently recognized that leases of oil and gas can create
profits.6 In the instant case the court restated its general construction of
oil and gas leases as conveyances of estates but found that the provision
requiring acts of exploitation made impossible such a consiruction of. this
particular instrument.
1. Kentucky Statutes provide for dower in-lands in which the husband was seized
of a fee simple estate. Ky. REv. STAT. § 392.020 (1943).
2. Texas and Mississippi. Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil and Gas Co., 113
Tex. 160, 254 S. W. 290 (1923) ; Lloyd's Estate v. Mullen Tractor and Equipment Co.,
192 Miss. 62, 4 So. 2d 282 (1941); Pace v. State ex. rel. Rice, 191 Miss, 780, 4 So.
2d 270 (1941).
3. Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal. 2d 110, 43 P. 2d 788 (1935); Rich v. Doneghey,
71 Okla. 204, 177 Pac. 86 (1918); Phillips v. Springfield Crude Oil Co., 76 Kan.
783, 92 Pac. 1119 (1907).
4. Trimble v. Ky. River Coal Corp., 235 Ky. 301, 31 S. W. 2d 367 (1930).;
Gray-Mellon Oil Co. v. Fairchild, 219 Ky. 143, 292 S. W. 743 (1927); Wolfe
County v. Beckett, 127 Ky. 252, 105 S. W. 447 (1907).
5. Hurst v. Paken Oil Company, 287 Ky. 257, 152 S. W. 2d 981 (1941) ; Williams'
Adm'r v. Union Bank and Trust Co., 283 Ky. 644, 143 S. W. 2d 297 (1940); Swiss
Oil Corp. v. Hupp, 253 Ky. 542, 69 S. W. 2d 1037 (1934).
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In the case under discussion the real issue was the effect of these pro-
visions calling for periodic acts of exploitation. If such provisions left the
lessee with an estate but reduced the estate to one less than a fee, or resulted
in the creation of a profit, no dower was possible.6 The court reached the
conclusion that the interest was not one in which dower would be given, but
failed to characterize the interest created. As dower is allotted in estates in
fee simple determinable or in estates in fee simple on condition subsequent,7
the court apparently concluded that the lease under construction created either
an estate smaller than a fee or a profit. It can hardly be assumed that the court
overruled the cases allowing dower in determinable and defeasible fees when
there was no discussion of this point in the opinion.
In a state such as Kentucky, which admits the possibility of the creation
of an estate in fee by an oil and gas lease, it would seem that a limitation or
a condition in such a lease would have the same effect on the estate created
as in any other conveyance of real estate, that is, make it determinable or de-
feasible. And this has been the accepted position.8 If the added provisions in
the instant case leave the property interest an estate in fee, it would appear to
be a determinable or defeasible fee simple, especially in the light of the Ken-
tucky statute providing that conveyances in land shall be deemed estates
in fee simple or such other estate as grantor had the power to dispose of, un-
less a different purpose appears by "express words or necessary inference." 9
If it is held that the provisions result in the changing of the interest from
an estate to a profit, the case seems out of line with existing authority.
PUBLIC UTILITIES-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-EXTRATERRITORIAL
CONTROL OF STREET RAILWAYS
The Tennessee Railroad and Public Utilities Commission granted X
Coach Corporation certificates of convenience and necessity empowering it
to operate motor busses from a point two and one-half miles outside to a point
6. See Trimble v. Ky. River Coal Corp., 235 Ky. 301, 31 S. W. 2d 367, 372
(1930), where the court, by way of dicta, stated that a widow in Kentucky was
entitled to dower in an incorporeal hereditament. However, this statement cites as
authority the case of Stevens' Heirs -v. Stevens, 33 Ky. (3 Dana) 371 (1835), and
this latter case, speaking of a ferry, reads "incorporated" hereditament, rather than
"incorporeal" hereditament and thus was apparently a case under the earlier Kentucky
law to the effect that stocks in real estate corporations, turn-pike companies, and
similar incorporated enterprises were real estate.
7. Landers v. Landers, 151 Ky. 206, 151 S. W. 386 (1912) ; Rice v. Rice, 133 Ky.
406, 118 S. W. 270 (1909) ; Fry v. Scott, 11 S. W. 426 (1889).
8. Wade, Recent Mississippi Oil and Gas Cases, 18 Miss. L. J. 243 (1947);
Blake, The Oil and Gas Lease, 13 So. CALIF. L. REV. 304, 393 (1940). 1 SUMIMERS,
OIL AND GAS § 153 (1938) discusses the Texas holding that a determinable fee is
created, and lists some objections which may be made to the theory.
9. Ky. Rrv. STAT. § 381.060 (1943).
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inside the City of Kingsport. P, a street railway company, holding a franchise
from the city, sued in chancery to set aside the proceeding of the Commission,
contending that by statute the city had exclusive jurisdiction over street rail-
way companies both inside its municipal limits, and, within a specified radius,
outside such limits. The lower court upheld the contentions of P and declared
the certificate void. Held, that the effect of the act divested the Commission of
its jurisdiction over street railways and gave to the cities exclusive control
which extended beyond the corporate limits. City Transportation Corp., Inc.
v. Pharr, - S. W. 2d - (Tenn. 1948).
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of a municipality is confined to
its corporate limits and affairs therein.' However, legislative bodies at various
times have made exceptions to this general rule by conferring upon municipal-
ities jurisdiction to control various interests in territory contiguous to the
corporation. Examples of the granting of this power, and the purpose behind
it, are numerous.2 In some instances, however, the courts have refusedto up-
hold the validity of such legislation.3 A survey of the cases leads to the con-
clusion that the real test is the reasonableness of the regulation and the re-
sults which spring from it.
In the instant case the court upheld the validity of a Tennessee Statute 4
giving municipalities control of street railway transportation both inside and
outside the corporate limits, the radius varying with the populaton of the
city. Further, it was held that this statute granted exclusive jurisdiction to
the city to the exclusion of the State Commission. In his opinion Chief Justice
Neil stated: ". . . public necessity required that a single system should be
under one authority. It is unthinkable that the Legislature would place the
general control of a city transportation system under two conflicting jurisdic-
tions to the utter demoralization of its operation and injury to the traveling
public." 5 A search of the codes of a number of the larger states reveals only
1. City of Sedalia ex rel. Ferguson v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 81 F. 2d 193 (C. C. A.
8th 1936) ; Jones v. Hines, 157 Ala. 624, 47 So. 739 (1908) ; Langley v. City Council
of Augusta, 118 Ga. 590, 45 S. E. 486 (1903); South Pasadena v. Los Angeles Terminal
Ry. Co., 109 Cal. 315, 41 Pac. 1093 (1895) ; City of Elkhart v. Lipschitz, 164 Ind. 671,
74 N. E. 528 (1905) ; City of Argenta v. Keath, 130 Ark. 334, 197 S. W. 686 (1917). Also
see 37 Am. JUR., Municipal Corporations § 122.
2. Chicago Packing and Provision Co. v. Chicago, 88 Ill. 221 (1878) (packing
houses) ; People v. Raims, 20 Colo. 489, 39 Pac. 341 (1895) '(intoxicating liquors);
O'Brien v. Amerman, 112 Tex. 254, 247 S. W. 270 (1922) (harbor control); City of
Little Rock v. Smith, 204 Ark. 692, 163 S. W. 2d 705 (1942) (venereal disease) ; State
v. Rice, 158 N. C. 635, 74 S. E. 582 (1912) (sanitary purposes) ; Salt Lake City v. Young,
45 Utah 349, 145 Pac. 1047 (1915) (public health) ; White v. City of Decattir, 225 Ala.
646, 144 So. 873 (1932) (police or sanitary regulations).
3. Gulf Refining Co. v. City of Knoxville, 136 Tenn. 253, 188 S. W. 798 (1916)
(privilege tax); Malone v. Williams, 118 Tenn. 390, 103 S. W. 798 (1907) (albatement
of nuisances). In the Gulf case the court actually construed the statute so as not to
raise the extraterritorial question, and thereby avoided the constitutional issue.
4. TENNr. CODE § 5447.1 (Williams, Supp. 1947).
5. City Transportation Corp., Inc. v. Pharr, - S. W. 2d - (Tenn. 1948).
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one, Illinois,r with a staite similar to that in question, and it does not
appear that the Supreme Court of that State has had occasion to pass on the
validity of that act.
Thus it would appear that not only is this a case of first impression in
Tennessee, but apparently the first case of its kind in the United States where-
in a court has been called upon to decide the validity of a legislative act grant-
ing a municipality exclusive extraterritorial control of its urban mass transpor-
tation system. In Malone v. Williams, an early Tennessee case, the court held
unconstitutional a statute empowering the City Council of Memphis to reg-
ulate by ordinance sanitary building conditions up to ten miles outside the
city limits, and to exercise all governmental and police powers up to two miles
outside the corporate limits. If the decision of the Malone case 7 is accepted
as the law on the question of the validity of municipal control beyond its
corporate limits, then the court in the instant case has qualified that law in
Tennessee. However, the instant case seems to indicate that the law has not
been changed, but that the court has distinguished the Malone case on its
peculiar facts and has indicated, though not specifically, that the test of the
validity of any such extraterritorial legislation is its reasonableness.
It appears, however, that one important issue may have been overlooked.
Did the court consider the 1945 Amendment to the Act? In quoting from the
Act the court says: "'... and the regulation hereih provided for shall be
exercised both within the municipal limits and ouside thereof within a radius
of seven miles from the corporate limits into the country.'" However in 1945 8
the Legislature enacted an amendment to make the zone of extraterritorial
control dependent upon the population of the municipality. In the case of
Kingsport the extent of control would be one mile. Was the amendment con-
sidered, or did the court use the "seven mile" example to show that even the
extreme of the radius was reasonable under the circumstances in view of the
purpose of the Act? The latter is more feasible; but in either event it is im-
probable that the result would have been altered by this consideration alone.
It is submitted that the court has given effect to the intent of the Legisla-
ture, and if the municipality is to have control of its street railways it is es-
sential that it be given authority to control the entire system in its metropolitan
area without interference from a state administrative agency. However, it is
still questionable whether it is to the manifest interest of the municipality to
allow it to control its street railways inside or outside its corporate limits.
6. ILL. STAT. c. 111-2/3, § 90e (Smith-Hurd, 1935).
7. Malone v. Williams, 118 Tenn. 390, 103 S. W. 798 (1907).
8. Public Acts Tenn. 1945, c. 97, § 1.
9. Quaere: How would the court deal with an attempt by two adjacent municipalities
to regulate a street railway system which operated in both, or, in an area which both"controlled?"
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SALES-EXCLUSION OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES BY EXPRESS DISCLAIMER
D received -five coin operated music machines under a conditional sales
contract. One of the machines did not operate and the others were a complete
failure for the purpose intended. D failed to pay the installments on the
maclines as they became due. P brought an actioi in replevin to which D filed
a cross-complaint alleging rescission of the contract and seeking recovery of
down payment. D alleged a breach of implied warranty of the fitness of ma-
chines for the purpose intended. The contract contained the following pro-
vision: "This contract contains the entire agreement between the parties hereto
and is not subject to cancellation and no warranties, agreements or guarantees
have been made by the seller unless endorsed hereon in writing. No provision
hereof shall be excluded, modified or limited except by written instrument ex-
pressly referring thereto and setting forth the provision so excluded, modified
or limited." P contends that there was no warranty of quality of machines either
express or implied. The lower court read to the jury section 15 of the, Sales
Act 1 relating to implied warranties. The jury was instructed that the seller must
have known the particular purpose to be made of the machines and the buyer
must have relied on the seller's skill or judgment to raise an implied warranty.
The jury was further instructed that the defects must be of a substantial na-
ture. The lower court gave judgment for D. On appeal, held, the statute was
applicable and the Court's instruction applying it as the law of the case was a
correct declaration of the law. Kanaster v. Berry, 206 S. W. 2d 13 (Ark. 1947).
In the instant case the court did not feel that the provision in the contract
necessarily excluded implied warranties arising underi section 15 -of the Sales
Act.2 Cases at the common law 3 and under the Sales Act 4 generally concede
that implied warranties may be excluded. Also the express provisions of section
71 of the Sales Act 5 provide that obligations arising by implication of law
1. ARx. STAT. ANN. Sales § 15 p. 1174 (Supp. Pope's Digest 1944).
2. Section 15 of the UNI'ORA SALES Acr is taken almost verbatim from section 14
of the English SALE OF GooDs ACT. It is stated by some that the UNFoRm SALES
ACT is merely declaratory of the common law. Child's Dining Hall Co. v. Swingler,
173 Md. 490, 197 Atl. 105 (1938) ; Hoback v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works of Nashville
20 Tenn. App. 280, 98 S. W. 2d 113 (1936) ; 1 WILLISTON, SALES 440 (2d ed. 1924). In
some states it has not materially, modified the existing rule. Davenport Ladder Co. v.
Edward Hines Lumber Co., 43 F. 2d 63 (C. C. A. 8th 1930). In others it has widened the
scope of implied warranties. Simpson v. Frank F. Pels Co., 199 App. Div. 854, 192 N. Y.
Supp. 538 (1st Dep't 1922) ; Keenan v. Cheny & Webb, 47 R. I. 125, 131 Atl. 309 (1925).
3. Taylor v. Bullen, 5 Ex. 779 (1850); Somerville v. Gullett Gin Co., 137 Tenn.
509, 194 S. W. 576 (1917).
4. Ford Motor Co. v. Cullum, 96 F. 2d 1 (C. C. A. 5th 1938), cert. denied, 305
U. S. 627 (1938); Modern Home Utilities Inc. v. Garrity, 121 Conn. 651, 186 Atl.
639 (1936); Kennedy v. Cornhusker Hybrid Co., 146 Neb. 230, 19 N. W. 2d 51
(1945) ; see Note, 160 A. L. P. 357 (1946).
5. Section 71 of the UNIFORM SALES ACT provides: "Where any, right duty or
liability would arise under a contract to sell or a sale by implication of law, it may be
negatived or varied by express agreement, or by the course of dealing between the
parties, or by custom, if the custom be such as to bind both parties to the contract or
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may be negatived by express agreement, course of dealings between the parties,
or by custom. 6 The main problem is ho-wv may these implied warranties be ex-
cluded. To answer this it is necessary to examine the basis of implied war-
ranties. Some jurisdictions feel that implied warranties arise from the intention
of the parties,7 and in these courts a liberal interpretation is given to disclaimer
clauses.8 Other courts take the position that the implied warranties arise by
operation of law and are entirely independent of the particular contract. In
such jurisdictions, the express disclaimer is usually strictly construed.' 0 This
latter view seeems to be the more accepted," and is the position taken by the
Arkansas court in the principal case.
It is difficult to state what words will be sufficient to disclaim all warranties.
The typical clause, as used in the instant case, that "the contract contains the
entire agreement" is a subject of controversy. Some courts'hold that such ex-
cludes all warranties,' 2 while others say it does not exclude those implied by
law.13 An agreement substantially to the effect that the buyer takes the article
"as is" usually is held to negative all warranties, 4 Generally the clause ex-
the sales." Section 152 of the English SALE OF GOODS AcT provides: "Where any
right, duty or liability would arise under a contract to sell or a sale by implication of
law, it may be negatived, or varied by express agreement. .. ."
6. W. F. Dollen & Sons v. Carl R. Miller Tractor Co., 214 Iowa 774, 241 N. W.
307 (1932); Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. v. Hocking, 54 N. D. 559, 209 N. W.
996 (1926); Lumbrazo v. Woodruff, 256 N. Y. 92, 175 N. E. 525 (1931); Hoover v.
Utah Nursery Co., 79 Utah 12, 7 P. 2d 270 (1932). It appears that only a small number
of cases have relied on this provision. See Note, 117 A. L. R. 1350, 1352 (1938). The
court in the principal case did not rely on this provision.
7. Burntisland Shipbuilding Cp. v. Barde Steel Product Corp., 278 Fed. 552 (D.
Del. 1922); Couts v. Sperry Flour Co., 85 Cal. App. 156, 259 Pac. 108 (Dist. Ct,
App. 1927).
8. See note 7 supra.
9. J. B. Colt Co. v. Bridges, 162 Ga. 154, 132 S. E. 889 (1926) ; Sterling-Midland
Coal Co. v. Great Lakes Coal & C. Co., 334 Ill. 281, 165 N. E. 793 (1929) ; Bekkevold
v. Potts, 173 Minn., 87, 216 N. W. 790 (1927); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Frank, 57
N. D. 295, 221 N. W. 75 (1928) ; VOLD, SALES 468 (1931).
10. J. B. Colt Co. v. Bridges, 162 Ga. 154, 132 S. E. 889 (1926); Bekkevold
v. Potts, 173 Minn., 87, 216 N. W. 790 (1927); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Frank, 57
N. D. 295, 221 N. W. 75 (1928) ; VOLD, SALES 468 (1931).
11. 1 WILLISTON. SALES 475 (2d ed. 1924); VOLD, SAL.Es 468 (1931)
12. Sterling-Midland Coal Co. v. Great Lakes Coal & C. Co., 334 Ill., 281, 165
N. E. 793 (1929); S. F. Bowser & Co. v. Birmingham. 276 Mass. 289, 177 N. E,
268 (1931) ; Lasher Co. v. La Berge, 125 Me. 475, 135 AtI..31 (1926) ; Landes & Co.
v. Fallows, 81 Utah 432 19 P. 2d 389 (1933); see Notes, 127 A. L. R. 160 (1940),
133 A. L. R. 1364 (1941).
13. Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N. W. 790 (1927) ; Minneapolis Steel &
Machinery Co. v. Casey Land Agency, 51 N. D. 832, 201 N. W. 172 (1924).
Particularly under this type of disclaimer must we remember that the parol evidence
rules as to warranties is closely related to the problem of disclaimers. So a court may
hold that a provision that the contract contains the entire agreemenit may exclude
oral warranties but allow implied warranties. S. F. Bowser & Co. v. McCormack,
230 App. Div. 303, 243 N. Y. Supp. 442 (4th Dep't. 1930).
14. Rosenbush v. Learned, 242 Mass. 132, 136 N. E. 341 (1922) ; Tanikin v. Nelson-
Dowling Coal Co., 82 N. H. 96, 130 Atl. 26 (1925). A clause stating that the buyer takes
an artidle "with all faults" negatives implied warranties. Pearce v. Blackwell, 34 N. C.
49 (1851). So an agreement "to accept in its present condition" disclaims implied
warranties. Washington & L. R. Co. v. Southern Iron & Equipment Co., 28 Ga. App.
684, 112 S. E. 905 (1922).
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eluding "all warranties, expressed or implied" disclaims all warranties. 15
While it is clear that it may be done, appropriate phraseology may not be easy
to find that excludes all warranties. It would seem advisable to state that ex-
cept for written warranties, the buyer takes the goods as they are, relying not
on the seller, but on his own judgment.16 Further, it should be declared spe-
cifically that there are no other warranties, either promissory or independently
imposed by law, whether based on promises, express limitations, tacit repre-
sentations,' descriptions, or any other ground whatever, whether statutory or
otherwise.'
In the instant case Arkansas has joined the group of states that places a
strict construction on express disclaimers. Perhaps in view of a sensed in-
equality between buyer and seller,' 8 the tendency today is to increase the
buyer's protection by increasing implied warranties and limiting disclaimers. 19
But under the present state of the law, disclaimers that are fully stated must
be given effect or the courts must indulge in judicial legislation. 20 If the situa-
tion is such that the buyer needs added protection,2 ' this should be done by
appropriate legislation. One method of limiting disclaimers is by the use of
statutory commodity controls.22 Perhaps the real solution is suggested by the
North Dakota statute that expressly provides that certain implied warranties
cannot be waived.23 One might wonder if the time is ripe for an amendment to
15. Williams v. Bullock Tractor Co., 186 Cal. 32, 198 Pac. 780 (1921); Oldfield
v. International Motor Co., 138 Md. 35. 113 Atl. 632 (1921); Kolodzcak v. Peerles
Motor Co., 255 Mich. 47, 237 N. W. 41 (1931); Industrial Finance Corporation
v. Wheat, 142 Miss. 536, 107 So. 382 (1926) ; Glasser v. Dodge Brog. Corp., 112 N. J.
Eq. 11, 163 Ati. 121 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
16. VOLD, SALES 469 (1931).
17. VOLD, SALEs 470 (1931). In Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. v. Hocking,
54 N. D. 559, 209 N. W. 996 (1926), the disclaimer read: ". . . there are no repre-
sentations, agreements, obligations or conditions express or implied, statutory or other-
wise, relating to the subject matter hereof, other than herein contained. . . " In
Larson v. Inland Seed Co., 143 Wash. 557, 255 Pac. 919 (1927), the disclaimer read:
"Garden City Feed Mills gives no warranty, express or implied, as to description,
quality, productiveness, or any other matter, of any seeds it sends out, and will be
in no way responsible for the crop."
18. Bogert and Fink, Business Practice Regarding Warranties in the Sale of Goods,
25 ILL. L. REv. 400, 413 (1930).
19. In Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N. W. 790 (1927), it was stated
the doctrine of implied warranties should be extended. VOLD, SALES 469 (1931) ; Note
[1939] Wis. L. REv. 459:
20. See notes 3 and 4 supra.
21. Bogert and Fink, Business Practice Regarding Warranties in the Sale of
Goods, 25 ILL. L. REV. 400, 413 (1930). The writers point out that the standard dis-
claimers and other practices used by big business often leave the buyer little chance
of survival.
22. Germofert Mfg. Co. v. Cathcart, 104 S. C. 125, 88 S. E. 535 (1916); Jones
v. Cordele Guano Co., 94 Ga. 14, 20 S. E. 265 (1894); Note Statutory Commodity
Standards, 31 COL. L. REv. 872 (1931).
23. N. D. RFv. CODE § 51-0707 (1943), Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. Jackson.
287 U. S. 283 (1932) ; Bratberg v. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co., 61 N. D. 452, 238
N. W. 552 (1931).
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the Uniform Sales Act that would allow no waiver of implied warranties in
certain fields.
24
TORTS-IMMUNITY OF CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS- EFFECT OF
LIABILITY INSURANCE
Plaintiff, five years of age, brought an action for personal injuries
allegedly resulting from the negligent maintenance of an attractive nuisance
by defendant, a charitable institution. Defendant denied liability because of
its eleemosynary character. Plaintiff's replication alleged that defendant pos-
sessed a liability insurance policy in which the insurer agreed (1) to pay losses
of defendant occasioned by its torts and (2) to refrain from invoking the
defense of immunity unless requested to do so by defendant. The lower court
sustained a motion to strike the replication and dismissed the suit. Held, judg-
ment reversed; the replication was sufficient as a matter of law, and would
rebut the defense of immunity. Wendt v. Servite Fathers, 76 N. E. 2d 342
(Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1947).
Charities, in many states, are still exempt either partially or completely
from tort liability.' As indicated in the principal case, the courts justify this
exemption with one or more of four theories: (1) the trust fund may not be
diverted from the purpose for which it was established; (2) public policy de-
mands that the charity remain intact and it is better for the individual to suffer
loss than the charity; (3) the beneficiary of the charity impliedly waives
any claim for damages; (4) the rule of the respondeat superior is not appli-
cable to institutions not conducted for profit. The trend in recent years in
states which have not actually repudiated the doctrine of immunity has been
toward a qualification of it by refusing to extend it to new situations, particu-
larly when the refusal can be rationalized with the theory used in the particular
jurisdiction to support the doctrine.2 Illustrative of such a restriction is the
refusal in a few states to allow the defense of immunity when it appears
that the charity owns or operates a business other than for charitable purposes,
the rationalization being that the trust fund will not be depleted contrary to
,24. Bogert and Fink, Business Practice Regarding Warranties in tie Sale of
Goods, 25 ILL. L. REV. 400, 413 (1930).
1. PROSsER, ToRTs § 108 (1941); 29 IOWA L. REv. 624 (1944) ; see NOTE,, 14'
A. L. -R. 572 (1921) and supplementary annotations.
2. This trend is the result in part of severe criticism of the doctrine and its under-
lying theories by authorities and by courts both repudiating it or rejecting one theory
in favor of another. Appleman, The Tort Liability of Charitable Institutions, 22
A. B. A. J. 48 (1936) ; Feezer, The Tort Liability of Charities, 77 U. OF PA. L. REV.
191 (1928); Zollman, Damage Liability of Charitable Institutions, 19 Micni. L. REV.
395 (1921); 22 VA. L. REv. 58 (1935); 48 YALE L. J. 81 (1938); 1 VAND. L. Rrv.
153' (1947); see especially, Rutledge, J., in Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130
F. 2d 810 (App. D. C. 1942) texhaustive treatment of subject).
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the intent of the donor if a judgment against the charity is satisfied only out
of such business. 3 A similar situation is presented in the principal case, in
which the question is raised whether immunity should be available to a
charity which, by procuring liability insurance,4 has provided a fund from
which tort liability may be collected without impairing its trust fund.
5
Most of the courts adjudicating this question answer in the affirmative,
6
on the ground that the basis of a charity's legal responsibility for its torts
cannot be changed by the mere act of acquiring insurance. They feel that by
creating liability where none existed before they would be altering the contract
of the insurer.7 His obligation can arise .only after a judgment has been ob-
tained against the charity, and since a charity is absolutely immune, no judg-
ment can be had against it and no obligation on the part of the insurer can
arise.8
3. St. Mary's Academy v. Solomon, 77 Colo. 463, 238 Pac. 22 (1925); Robertson
v. Executive Committee of Baptist Convention, 55 Ga. App. 469, 190 S. E. 432 (1937),;
McMillen v. Summunduwot Lodge, 143 Kan. 502, 54 P. 2d 985 (1936); Holder v.
Massachusetts Horticultural Society, 211 Mass. 370, 97 N. E. 630 (1912); Rhodes v.
Millsaps College, 179 Miss. 596, 176 So. 253 (1937) ; Gamble v. Vanderbilt University,
138 Tenn. 616, 200 S. W. 510 (1918).
4. Some of the cases make a distinction between "indemnity" policies and "liability"
policies, emphasizing the point that there can be no liability in the former case until there
has been an actual loss by the charity. Williams' Adm'x v. Church Home for Females
and Infirmary for Sick, 223 Ky. 355, 3 S. W. 2d 753 (1928); Mississippi Baptist
Hospital v. Moore, 156 Miss. 676, 126 So. 465 (1930).
5. The plaintiff as a rule raises the question only in states basing immunity upon
-the trust-fund or public-policy theories, his contention being that the trust fund will
not be dissipated nor will operation of the charity be endangered by a recovery measured
by the insurance. Obviously, the existence of insurance would not destroy the reasoning
behind the implied-waiver or non-applicability-of-respondeat-superior theories, though
the issue was unsuccessfully raised in two states. Schau v. Morgan 1241 Wis. 334,
6 N. V. 2d 212 (1942) (respondeat superior); Stonaker v. Big Sisters Hospital,
116 Cal. App. 375, 2 P. 2d 520 (1931) (waiver).
6. Stonaker v. Big Sisters Hospital, 116 Cal. App. 375, 2 P., 2d 520 (19315;
Levy v. Superior Court of California, 74 Cal. App. 171, 239 Pac. 1100 (1925); Piper
v. Epstein, 326 Ill. App. 400, 62 N. E. 2d 139 (1st Dist. 1945) (compare with
principal case); Williams' Adm'x v. Church Home for Females and Infirmary for
Sick, 223 Ky. 355, 3 S. W. 2d 753 (1928); McKay v. Morgan Memorial Co-op
Industries and Stores, 272 Mass. 121, 172 N. E. 68 (1930); Enman v. Trustees of
Boston University, 270 Mass. 299, 170 N. E. 43 (1930); Greatrex v. Evangelical
Deaconess Hospital, 261 Mich. 327, 246 N. W. 137 (1933); Mississippi Baptist
Hospital v. Moore, 156 Miss. 676,. 126 So. 465 (1930) ; Dille v. St. Luke's Hospital,
196 S. W. 2d 615 (Mo. 1946); Stedem v. Jewish Memorial Hospital Ass'n of
Kansas City, 187 S. W. 2d 469 (Mo. App. 1945); Herndon v. Massey, 217 N. C.
610, 8 S. E., 2d 914 (1940); Emrick v. Pennsylvania R. Y.M.C.A. of Crestline,
69 Ohio App. 353, 43 N. E. 2d 733 (1942)' Susman v. Y.MC.A. of Seattle, 101
Wash. 487, 172 Pac. 554 (1918); Schau v. Morgan, 241 Wis. 334, 6 N. W. 2d
212 (1942).
7. This would seem to have validity only if the policy is one of idemnity against
loss and the premium paid takes account of the low risk of legal loss by the charity.
Otherwise the charity is paying for unnecessary and illusory protection. According to
Appleman, these policies are almost pure "gravy" accounts, and "most of the better
companies now have a provision in their policies preventing the raising of the defense
of immunity except with the written consent of the insured, and this is usually re-
served as a means of combatting fraudulent claims or malingering." 7 APPLE aAN, IN-
sURANcE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4502 n. 94 (1942).
8. Other reasons assigned by courts are: (1) a trustee cannot by his acts (10,
indirectly what he is prohibited by law from doing directly, Levy v. Superior Court
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Two states following the "qualified" trust-fund theory predicate a nega-
tive answer on the reasoning that trust-fund property is not appropriated
and the charity suffers no loss if liability is permitted to the extent of the
insured amount.9 It would seem that if the charity pays a full premium, re-
gardless of whether the policy is one of "indemnity" or of "liability," courts
using the trust-fund or public-policy theories could impose liability by con-
struing the promise of the insurer to mean to save harmless against such
claims as could be enforced against it if it were not a charitable institution. 0
In analogous fields a majority of the courts have also shown some reluctance
to abrogate a defendant's right to immunity solely because he carries liability
insurance. Where governmental agencies purchase insurance, in the absence
of a statute expressly empowering the agency to purchase it for the benefit
of injured third persons,1 the majority rule is that the immunity afforded
by the law when the agency performs governmental functions is not removed
by the act of acquiring the insurance. 12 A parent is generally held not liable
to a minor child, nor one spouse to the other, for a personal tort, even in the
of California, 74 Cal. App. 171, 239 Pac. 1100 (1925); (2) freedom of a charity to
contract is restricted and (3) the trust fund might be dissipated through imposition of
higher premium rates commensurate with the higher risk of insurer. Stedem v.
Jewish Memorial Hospital Ass'n of Kansas City, 187 S. W. 2d 469 (Mo. App. 1945?;
but cf. Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d 810, 823 (App. D. C. 1942) (It
is highly doubtful that any substantial charity would be destroyed or donation deterred
by the cost required to pay the premiums.").
9. O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n, 105 Colo. 259, 96 P. 2d
835 (1939); Vanderbilt University v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S. W.
2d 284 (1938); cf. McLeod v. St. Thomas Hospital, 170 Tenn. 423, 95 S. W. 2d
917 (1936); but cf. Knox County Tuberculosis Sanitarium v. Moss, 5 Tenn. App.
589 (1927). See also Lusk v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 199 So. 666,
667 (La. App. 1941). Note that Massachusetts and Mississippi follow the "qualified"
trust-fund theory but did not impose liability where insurance was carried. In both
states the torts were committed by the charity on property used exclusively for charitable
purposes.
Though recent majority-rule cases attempt to reconcile the two positions by
distinguishing between the "absolute" and "qualified" trust-fund theories [Piper v.
Epstein, 326 Ill. App. 400, 62 N. E. 2d -139 (1945); Stedem v. Jewish Memorial
Hospital of Kansas City, 187 S. W. 2d 469 (Mo. App. 1945)] the court in the instant
case refused to concede that exemption in Illinois was "absolute."
10. 3 Scorr, TRUSTS § 402 (1939).
11. In Taylor v. Knox County Board of Education, 292 Ky. 767, 167 S. W. 2d
700 (1942), recovery was allowed because of a statute empowering the board to carry in-
surance, the policy stipulating that insurer could not assert the defense of immunity.
12. Brooks v. Clark County, 297 Ky. 549, 180 S. W. 2d 300 (1944) (court
approved of plaintiff's contention, but refused to overrule precedents) ; Simons v.
Gregory, 120 Ky. 116, 85 S. W. 751 (1905) ; Kesman v. School District of Fallow-
field Tp., 345 Pa. 457, 29 A. 2d 17 (1942); Bradfield v. Board of Education of
Pleasants County, 36 S. E. 2d 512 (W. Va. 1945) (statute authorized board to carry
insurance). By analogy to the charity cases, Tennessee has imposed liability, Rogers v.
Butler, 170 Tenn. 125, 92 S. W. 2d 414 (1936) ; Taylor v. Cobble, 28 Tenn. App. 167,
187 S. W. 2d 648 (1945). But the logic of analogy fails where an agency without authority
attempts to waive its immunity in the policy because of its governmental character; noth-
ing prevents a charity from waving immunity. Pohland v. City of Sheboygan, 251 Wis.
20, 27 N. W. 2d 736 (1947). 
\
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event insurance is present,13 though a few well reasoned recent cases have
held otherwise.'
4
The language of the court in the principal case evidences a dissatisfaction
with the immunity dtoctrine and a determination to restrict its application
whenever possible. The value of the decision lies in the fact that it marks the
first instance in which a state supposedly following the "absolute" trust-fund
theory has imposed liability where insurance is carried.' 5
13. Owens v. Auto Mutual Indemnity Co., 235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133 (1937); Rambo
vs. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S. W. 2d 468 (1938); Small v. Morrison, 185 N. C. 577,
118 S. E. 12 (1923) (vigorous dissent) ; Lasecki v. Kabara, 235 Wis. 645, 294 N. W. 33
(1940) ; Silverstein v. Kastner, 342 Pa. 207, 20 A. 2d 205 (1941).
14. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930); Worrell v. Worrell,
174 Va. 11, 4 S. E. 2d 343 (1939) ; Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S. E. 538 (1932) ;
see McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P.; 2d 940, 954 (1943) (concurring
opinion). McCurdy, Torts Between. Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HIv. L. REV.
1030 (1930); Note, 44 HARv. L. REv. 135 (1931).
15. The court indicated that the same result would have been reached even if the
insurance had been "indemnity," not "liability," and the insured had not expressly waived
immunity. Also note that the injured here was not a beneficiary of the charity, but a
stranger, so that the waiver theory of immunity was inapplicable.
